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Abstract
Advancement in communication technology provides a scalable platform for
various services where a remote user can access the server from anywhere without
moving from its place. It has provided a unique opportunity for online services,
such that the user need not physically present at the service center. These services
adopt authentication and key agreement protocols to ensure authorized and se-
cure access to resources. Most of the authentication schemes support single server
environment where the user has to register with each server. If a user wishes to
access multiple application servers, he requires to register with each of the servers.
Although multi-server authentication schemes introduced a scalable platform such
that a user can interact with any server using single registration. Recently, Chuang
and Chen proposed an efficient multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme
based on smart cards along with password and biometrics. This is a lightweight
authentication scheme which requires the computation of only hash function. In
this article, we present a brief review of Chuang and Chen’s scheme. We analyze
Chuang and Chen’s scheme and identify that their scheme does not resist stolen
smart card attack which causes the user’s impersonation attack, server spoofing
attack and man-in-the middle attack. Additionally, we show that their scheme has
a weak key agreement protocol, which does not ensure forward secrecy.
keywords: Network Security; Multi-server communication; Smart card; Biometric based
authentication; Anonymity.
1 Introduction
The advances in communication technology are enhancing the quality of online services.
As a result, the Internet is emerging a scalable platform for various services where users
and service providers are realizing its importance. This provides a unique opportunity to
the users, such that they can access the remote servers at anytime and from anywhere.
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However, the user interacts with the server via public channel where an adversary is
considered to be enough powerful that he can control over the public channel, such that
he can eavesdrop, intercept, modify, delete, and replay the transmitted message via public
channel. This causes a serious threat to the data security and integrity. At the same time,
the authenticated key agreement protocols provide secure and authorized communication
between remote entities. The smart card based authentication protocols are designed and
developed to provide authorized and secure communication between the remote user and
the server.
Most of the existing authentication protocol only supported a single server environ-
ment [1]. However, a user may wish to access multiple application servers at the same
time for various of kinds of application. Therefore, if the authentication scheme does not
support the multi-server environment, the user has performed the registration on each of
the servers. This makes the system very complex from the user point of view and a user
may leave the system.
Most of the existing schemes that support multi server environment are password based [2].
The password based authentication schemes provide two-factor remote user authentica-
tion while biometrics based user authentication schemes provide three-factor authenti-
cation. Moreover, uniqueness property of biometric increases its application in authen-
tication protocols. Therefore, biometric-based remote user authentication schemes have
attracted significant research attention. The Biometric based schemes have the advan-
tages of biometric keys (fingerprint, face, iris, hand geometry and palm-print, etc.), which
are as follows:
(1) Biometric keys do not need to remember.
(2) Biometric keys cannot be easily guess.
(3) Biometric keys maintain the uniqueness property.
In 2010, Yang and Yang [3] proposed biometric-based multi-server authentication schemes.
However, there scheme computational cost is high, as it needs to perform exponential
operations. In 2011, Yoon and Yoo [4] also presented a biometric-based authenticated
key agreement scheme for multi-server environment. Although He [5] pointed out the vul-
nerabilities of Yoon and Yoo’s scheme to insider attacks, masquerade attacks and loss of
smart card attacks. Moreover, both the schemes fail to protect user’s privacy. Recently,
Chuang and Chen [6] proposed an anonymous multi-server authenticated key agreement
scheme based on smart cards along with password and biometrics. Their scheme provides
an efficient solution for multi-server environment, where a user interact with any server
using single registration. In this article, we present a brief review of Chuang and Chen’s
scheme. We also present cryptanalysis of Chuang and Chen’s scheme and show that their
scheme does not resist stolen smart card attack which causes the user’s impersonation
attack, server spoofing attack and man-in-the middle attack. Additionally, we saw that
their scheme has a weak key agreement protocol, which does not ensure forward secrecy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the brief review of
Chuang and Chen’s scheme. Section 3 points out the weaknesses of Chuang and Chen’s
scheme. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
2 Review of Chuang and Chen’s Scheme
Recently, Chuang and Chen [6] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme using
biometric-based smart card. In this section, we will briefly discuss the Chuang and
Chen’s scheme, in which we try to use the same terminology as presented in their article.
2.1 Server registration phase
The application server sends a registration request to the registration center if he wishes
to be become authorized server in the system. Then, registration center authorized the
server and provides the key PSK to the server using Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) [7].
Upon receiving the secret key PSK, the authorized server uses this key to authorize the
legitimate user.
2.2 Registration Phase
Step 1. The user U computes h(PWi ⊕ BIOi) and sends his registration request with
IDi and h(PWi ⊕ BIOi) to the registration center via secure channel.
Step 2. The registration center computes Ai = h(IDi||x), Bi = h(Ai) = h
2(IDi||x),
Ci = h(PWi ⊕ BIOi)⊕ Bi and Di = PSK ⊕ Ai.
Step 3 Registration center personalizes the user’s smart card by including the parame-
ters {IDi, Bi, Ci, Di, h(·) and provides the personalized smart card to the user via
a secure channel.
2.3 Login Phase
To start the login session, the user inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs
his identity IDi and password PWi, and imprints his biometric information BIOi at the
sensor. Upon receiving the input, the smart card executes the login session as follows:
Step 1. Verify IDi and Bi
?
= h(PWi ⊕ BIOi) ⊕ Ci. If the verification succeeds, it
executes the next step.
Step 2. Generate a random number N1 and compute M1 = h(Bi)⊕N1, AIDi = h(N1)⊕
IDi and M2 = h(N1||AIDi||Di).
2.4 Authentication Phase
Step 1. The smart card sends the authentication request with the message< AIDi,M1,M2, Di >
to the server.
Step 2. Upon receiving the message < AIDi,M1,M2, Di >, server S uses its pre-shared
key PSK and achieves Ai = Di⊕PSK. The server also retrieves N1 = h(Bi)⊕M1
and IDi = AIDi ⊕ h(N1).
Step 3. The server verifies M2
?
= h(N1||AIDi||Di). If verification holds, the server
generates a random number N2 and computes the session key SKij = h(N1||N2).
Step 4. The server computes M3 = N2 ⊕ h
2(N1) and M4 = h(SIDj||N2) and responds
with the message < SIDj,M3,M4 > to the smart card.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message < SIDj ,M3,M4 >, the smart card retrieve the
value N2 = M3⊕h
2(N1). Then, it verifies M4
?
= h(SIDj||N2). If verification holds
then computes the session key SKij = h(N1||N2).
Step 6. The smart card computes M5 = SKij ⊕ h(N2) and sends M5 to the server.
Step 7. Upon receiving < M5 >, the server verifies h(N2)
?
= M5⊕SKij . If the varication
holds, the mutual authentication completes.
2.5 Password change phase
The legal user can change his password without the help of server as follows:
Step 1. A user inputs his identity IDi and PWi, and imprints his biometric BIOi at
the sensor.
Step 2. The smart card verifies IDi and Bi
?
= h(PWi ⊕BIOi)⊕Ci. If the verification
does not succeeds, the smart card rejects the request. Otherwise, the user can enter
a new password PW ∗i .
Step 3. The smart card computes C∗i = Ci ⊕ h(PWi ⊕ BIOi)⊕ h(PW
∗
i ⊕ BIOi) and
replace Ci with C
∗
i .
3 Cryptanalysis of Chuang and Chen’s Scheme
In this section, we analyze Chuang and Chen’s scheme and demonstrate some of the
attacks.
3.1 Stolen smart card attack
An efficient biometric based multi-server authentication protocol must not allow an adver-
sary to misuse user’s stolen smart card to login to the server or to compute established
session keys without knowing the user’s biometric and password. Here, we show that
Chuang and Chen’s scheme fails to resist stolen smart card, such that an adversary can
achieve user’s long term secret key and can easily login to the server as a legitimate user
using stolen smart card. Additionally, an adversary can achieve previously established
session keys. This creates the data security and integrity threat as user and server pro-
tect their confidential data during data transmission using the session key and if session
key is compromised, an adversary can achieve all the data that have been transferred
between the user and server. The stolen smart card attack executes on Chuang and
Chen’s scheme as follows:
• An adversary can achieve the stored parameters {IDi, Bi, Ci and Di from the smart
card using existing techniques, such as power analysis attack, differential attack etc.
• An adversary can intercept and record all the previously transmitted message M1 =
h(Bi)⊕Ni and M3 = N2 ⊕ h
2(N1).
• The adversary can achieve the values N1 = M1 ⊕ h(Bi) and N2 = M3 ⊕ h
2(N1).
• Using the values N1 and N2, the adversary achieve the session key SKij as SKij =
h(N1||N2).
It is clear from the above discussion that an adversary can achieve all the previously
established session key using the stolen smart card. Using the compromised session key,
an adversary can achieve all the confidential data that is transferred between user and
server as exchanged data is being protected by established session key and an adversary
can eavesdrop and intercept all the transmitted message between user and server.
3.1.1 User’s Impersonation attack
An adversary can also successfully login to the server using the stolen smart card without
having the user’s biometric imprint and password as follows:
• An adversary can achieve the stored parameters IDi, Bi and Di from the smart
card.
• The adversary generates a random number NE and computes M1E = h(Bi) ⊕
NE , AIDE = h(NE) ⊕ IDi and M2E = h(NE ||AIDE||Di). He masquerades as a
legitimate user U and sends the message < AIDE ,M1E ,M2E , Di > to the server.
• Upon receiving the message < AIDi,M1E ,M2E , Di >, the server achieves NE =
h(Bi) ⊕ M1E and IDi = AIDE ⊕ h(NE). Then, the server verifies the condition
M2E
?
= h(NE||AIDE||Di). The verification holds as M2E = h(NE ||AIDE||Di).
When verification holds, the server generates a random number N2 and computes
the session key SK ′ij = h(NE ||N2).
• The server computes M3E = N2 ⊕ h
2(NE) and M4 = h(SIDj||N2) and sends the
message < SIDj ,M3E ,M4 > to the user U .
• The adversary intercepts the message < SIDj,M3E ,M4 > and retrieves the value
N2 = M3E ⊕ h
2(NE) and SK
∗
ij = h(NE ||N2). He responds with the message
M∗
5
= SK∗ij ⊕ h(N2) to the server.
• Upon receiving M∗
5
, the server verifies h(N2)
?
= M∗
5
⊕ SK ′ij. The verification
holds as SK ′ij = SK
∗
ij = h(NE ||N2). This shows that the adversary successfully
masquerade as a legitimate user using the stolen smart card.
3.2 Server spoofing attack
Chuang and Chen’s scheme is vulnerable to the server spoofing attack, i.e., an adversary
can impersonate the server to the user. The detailed description is as follows:
• The adversary eavesdrops communication between users’ and smart card. He in-
tercepts the server’s response message < SIDj,M3,M4 > and achieves server’s
identity SIDj.
• When the smart card transmits the authentication request with the message <
AIDi,M1,M2, Di > to the server S via public channel, the adversary intercepts
the message. Then, the adversary responds with authorized message using the
achieved parameters IDi and Bi from the stolen smart card as follows:
1.) Compute N1 = M1 ⊕ h(Bi).
2.) Generate a random number NE .
3.) Compute M3E = NE ⊕ h
2(N1) and M4E = h(SIDj ||N2), and responds with
the message < SIDj ,M3E ,M4E > to the smart card.
• When the smart card retrieves N2E = M3E⊕h
2(N1) and verifiesM4E
?
= h(SIDj||N2E).
The verification holds as M4E = h(SIDj||N2).
This shows that an adversary can successfully impersonate as a server.
3.3 Man-in-the middle attack
Chuang and Chen’s scheme is vulnerable to the man-in-the middle attack. The justifica-
tion is as follows:
• When the smart card sends the message < AIDi,M1,M2, Di > to the server, the
adversary intercepts the message and performs the following steps:
i.) Compute N1 = M1 ⊕ h(Bi).
ii.) Generate a random number NE .
iii.) ComputeM1E = h(Bi)⊕NE , AIDE = h(NE)⊕IDi andM2E = h(NE ||AIDE||Di)
then sends the message < AIDE,M1E ,M2E , Di > to the server.
iv.) ComputeM3E = NE⊕h
2(N1) andM4E = h(SIDj||NE) then sends the message
< SIDj ,M3E ,M4E > to the smart card.
• When the server retrieves NE = h(Bi)⊕M1E and IDi = AIDi⊕h(NE) and verifies
M2
?
= h(N1||AIDi||Di). The verification holds as M4E = h(SIDj||NE). Then the
server computes the session key SKEj = h(NE ||N2).
• When the server responds with the message < SIDj ,M
′
3,M
′
4 >, where M
′
3 =
N2 ⊕ h
2(NE) and M
′
4
= h(SIDj||N2). The adversary intercepts the message and
executes the following steps:
a.) Compute N2 = M
′
3
⊕ h2(NE) and SKEj = h(NE ||N2).
b.) Send the message SKEj ⊕ h(N2) to the server.
• When the server verifies h(N2)
?
= SKEj ⊕ h(N2)⊕ SKEj. The verification holds.
• When the smart card retrieves the valueNE = M3E⊕h
2(N1) and verifiesM4E
?
= h(SIDj||NE).
The verification holds as M4E = h(SIDj||NE). The smart card computes the ses-
sion key SKI = h(N1||NE) as the verification holds.
• When the smart card sends SKiE ⊕ h(NE) to the server, the adversary intercept
the message.
• The adversary can compute the session key with user and server SKiE = h(N1||NE)
and SKEj = h(NE||N2), respectively.
It is clear from the above discussion that an adversary can make independent connections
with both the user and server where the user and serve believe that they are communi-
cating directly with each other. Moreover, the user and server compute the keys, such
that SKiE 6= SKEj. Although the adversary computes both the session keys SKiE and
SKEj.
3.4 Forward secrecy
Chuang and Chen’s scheme does not achieve forward secrecy as the adversary can com-
pute established session key with the user’s compromised long-term secret key Ai as
follows:
• Achieved user’s and server’s transmitted message < AIDi,M1,M2, Di > and <
SIDj,M3,M4 > via public channel, respectively.
• Compute Bi = h(Ai) and retrieve N1 = M1 ⊕ h(Bi) and then N2 = M3 = N2 ⊕
h2(N1).
• Compute the session key SKij = h(N1||N2).
4 Conclusion and future scope
We have shown that an adversary can successfully perform the stolen smart card attack
which causes the user’s impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and man-in-the
middle attack. We have also demonstrated that Chuang and Chen’s scheme does not
ensure forward secrecy.
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